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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUANE P. RUSSELL and VERLENE RUSSELL, his wife, and
JOHN DALE RUSSELL,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No.
10929

HOOPER IRRIGATION COMPANY, et al,

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The basic issue involved in this matter concerns the
scope and coverage of a condemnation proceeding between basically these same parties under another lawsuit and whether, in addition to the condemnation action, the plaintiffs in this proceeding can maintain a
separate trespass action against the condemnor. The
District Court in and for the Second Judicial District,
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Weber County, ruled that the prior condemnation proceeding concluded all damage matters between the parties, and granted summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Hooper Irrigation Company is a mutual irrigation company engaged in distributing water to its
stockholders in the western portions of Weber and
Davis Counties in a rural area. The Company has its
main canal and canal branches, and from each canal
branch the different users in the various areas take water
through separate ditches, referred to as laterals. The
plaintiffs in this action were water users on one of the
lateral ditches.
In an effort to better distribute water and to conserve water losses in its canals and lateral ditches the
defendant Company undertook an extensive program
of re-arranging the branch canals and laterals and, in
so doing, converted the former dirt and sod ditches and
canals into concrete-lined waterways.
The plaintiffs were water users and stockholders on
a small lateral ditch which ran west from one of the
Company's branch canals. They used the ditch along
with two others in the area-Effie Hooper and Charles
Pinkham. After considerable study and investigation
the Company concluded that these three users should
be placed into a larger ditch system with other users,
thereby consolidating two ditches into one. In order to
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effect this arrangement the new and enlarged ditch
would be placed in the same location as that of the
former ditch serving the three water users, and would
extend westerly beyond their properties, and would then
turn south in the direction of the properties of numerous
other water users.
To assist this Court in visualizing the area involved, Exhibits C, D and G of Case No. 35984 (which
was the condemnation action - incorporated into this
case by reference and Order (R. IO)) show the general
condition of the former lateral serving the three water
users in the late fall of 1959 just before the time that
the alleged trespass took place.
The subject lateral ditch was located along the
north side of the properties of the three water users in
the fenced portion of the county road. The Company
secured permission from the Weber County Commissioners and from the first two water users along the
route (i.e. Charles Pinkham and Effie Hooper) to
flatten and level the old ditch and to remove the brush
and trees along the route during the early part of December, 1959 (R. 7 g). Although the ditch was within
the county road area, both Pinkham and Hooper owned
to the center line of the highway.
This construction work and the manner of filling
the ditch can best be illustrated by examining Exhibit
F of Case No. 35984, which shows the filled-in ditch
opposite the Effie Hooper property at the point where
the Russell properties commence. However, as will be
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pointed out in argument, the title of the Russells did
not extend beyond their fence, and included no part of
the ditch area within the county road.
As indicated by appellants the construction activities on the dirt ditch lateral serving the three involved
water users commenced on or about December 7, 1959.
At that time the dirt lateral ditch was not carrying any
irrigation or stock water, inasmuch as all of the water
had been turned out of the main canal system ( R. 7 g) .
No use was being made of the lateral ditch for any pur·
pose whatsoever at the time.
When it became evident that defendants Russell
were going to object to the revised irrigation system
the respondent Company stopped construction activities at a point at the west end of the Effie Hooper
property - where the Russell properties commenced
on the south side of the county road (see Exhibit F Case No. 35984). Thereupon, on December 3, 1959, the
Company, acting through its Board of Directors,
adopted a resolution providing that eminent domain
proceedings be commenced pursuant to Sections 73-1-6
and 73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to enlarge the
existing dirt lateral ditch (see Exhibit A - Case No.
35984). On January 15, 1960, the respondent Com·
pany filed its Complaint in Case No. 35984 to acquire
the easement right which defendants Russell had in the
affected ditch lateral.
In subsequent court proceedings the action was
tried to a jury, which assessed damages in favor of de-
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fendants Russell against Hooper Irrigation Company
in Civil No. 35984 in the total amount of $260.00. That
judgment has been duly satisfied of record, and these
defendants contend that all items of damage due to the
appellants Russell were provided for and determined
in that proceeding.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT BETWEEN THE RUSSELLS AND ALL OTHER
LITIGANTS WERE CONCLUDED IN THE
CONDEMNATION LITIGATION.
Proceeding upon the long established premise that
in summary judgment cases the facts must be viewed
most favorably to the appellant, respondent will here
point out that as a matter of fact and law there are no
genuine issues left for determination which were not
concluded in the condemnation proceeding. Under Rule
56 ( c) it is well to note that the language specifies that
summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings,
admissions on file, affidavits and other matter show " ... That there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as ·a matter of law."
It can hardly be imagined that any type of litigation concludes every possible issue of fact; however, it
is the position of respondent that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact which remains in this
alleged trespass action.
5

The condemnation action was originally brought
against the Russells since the respondent Company was
affecting an easement right which the Russells had to
convey water through the former ditch along the public
street. However, when appellants state in their brief at
page 6, pursuant to an Affidavit filed by Duane P.
Russell, that there was a trespass "upon the land of
the plaintiff ... ", such is not the case. Immediately
prior to the commencement of condemnation proceedings and the securing of an Order of Occupancy in
Case No. 35984, the respondent Company did apparently engage in a technical trespass upon an unused and
dormant easement right of the Russells in the lands
of others. Without attempting to get involved in a
minute argument over the nature and degree of property rights, to farm folk in that area the easement
right of the Russells in the ditch area owned by Effie
Hooper and Charles Pinkham was not as evident as
would have been the situation had there been a trespass
upon land known to have been owned by the Russells.
At any rate, the Russells originally contended that the
trespass was on their fee land, but the proceedings in
Case No. 35984 clearly established that no trespass actually occurred on their fee land. In the Pre-Trial
Order in that action (R. 7 i) it was provided:
" ... With respect to the ownership of the la~d
upon which said ditch easement is located, it will
be held that defendants Russell own no part of
the fee upon which said ditch was located unless
proof thereof is submitted to opposing counsel
within thirty (30) days from the date hereof."
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These appellants never furnished such information,
the record is devoid of such proof, and the condemnation trial proceeded on the basis of the Russells owning
an easement right only.
The only issue which thus presents itself before
this Court is whether appellants Russell secured full
compensation for the damage to their easement under
the statutory provisions allowing joint use of irrigation
facilities. The answer to this question must be found
in the condemnation proceedings in Case No. 35984.
The Pre-Trial Order in the condemnation action
(Civil No. 35984) required defendants Russell to furnish this respondent with an itemization of the damages
claimed " ... arising out of and in connection with the
taking of the property rights described in the complaint:" In fact the very same foregoing words were
stated by counsel for these appellants in the statement
so furnished (R. 7 e). Further, in the furnished Statement of Claim for Damages the following items were
included as damages:
2. Construction of large head gate

opposite Effie Hooper property ...... $450.00

3.

Construction of large headgate 200
feet west of headgate previously
mentioned --------------------------------------------$300.00

Although these appellants on page 9 of their brief
state that they" ... did not contain a counterclaim for
the damage alleged in this suit ... ," they did in fact
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very definitely include two headgates in the county
road area to the north of and opposite the 12 acres of
land bordering the county road area. Actually, one
of the main items at issue in the condemnation case was
this very easement in the county roadway area. In
answer to a special interrogatory submitted to the jury
concerning this easement in Case No. 35984 ( R. 7 d)
the jury responded as follows:
2. Damage to the Russells' irrigation

easement in the public street,
if any ....................................................$258.00
IS/ Allison W. Ogan
Foreman

These appellants are in the situation of attempting
to take two shots at the same target. They overlook
the basic test of market value in eminent domain cases
which clearly establish that the measure of damages in
a case of the type here involved is that of the difference
in market value of the irrigation easement facility before and after the imposition of the new facility for irrigation purposes in place of the facility previously used
by appellants. Under the "before" and "after" rule the
various items affecting the difference in value are considered - such as headgates and diversion facilities and the jury awards an amount which should reflect
the total diminution in value, if any. Applying this
rule specifically to the condemnation action heretofore
tried and its relationship to this case, it should be clearly
remembered that, as to any headgates in the county
road area which may have been removed by this respond-
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ent during the course of construction there were placed
substitute facilities in place of those removed so as to
accomplish substantially what the prior facilities were
doing. It may well have been that the jury award of
$258.00 for damage to the appellants' irrigation easement in the public street in the condemnation proceeding might there have well been an unwarranted recovery. In any event, if a double recovery has not
heretofore been had, there is no justification for giving
appellants another shot at the very same alleged damage item.
So as to further assist this Court in arriving at a
mental picture of the new facility which was created
in the same location as the former dirt ditch lateral, an
examination of Exhibits 2, J and H in Case No. 35984
should point out - as the jury verdict clearly indicates
- the vastly improved facility made available to these
appellants and the other water users in the vicinity.
Appellants' Complaint (R. 1-p. 3) in this matter
alleges that respondent -
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". . . placed heavy earth-moving machinery
and equipment on the said lateral of the plaintiffs', filled a large portion of the lateral with
earth, and removed and destroyed numerous concrete and steel headgates and other water-control
facilities in said lateral; ... "
Since these were the alleged acts of trespass and damage - and since the only possible items of damage involving facilities having cost value were the headgates
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and other water control facilities which were fully and
adequately covered in the condemnation case, it is difficult to see where any other possible item of damage
could be raised in this trespass proceeding. Certainly,
when this problem arose in December of 1959, no use
was being made of the facility. And there is no claim
that the new facility was not in condition to adequately
substitute for the old facility when the irrigation season
commenced in the spring of 1960.
So that there will be no question that the condemnation proceeding adequately covered any and all damages to the irrigation easement, Instruction No. 2 ( 2)
of the Court to the jury in Civil No. 35984 is here
included:
"The amount of damages done, if any, to the
defendants' easement for irrigation water transfer in the public street in question. Such damages are the difference in the value of the irrigation easement before the taking by the Hooper
Irrigation Company's right to join in the use of
the ditch and the value of such joint use of the
easement to the defendant landowner's holding
lands, served by the ditch after the construction
of the project. That is, such a sum as will justly
compensate the defendants so they are no better
or worse off, or no poorer or richer than they
would have been if such a taking had not
occurred."
In sub-portion ( 1) of Instruction No. 2 the lower
Court further elaborated on the easement in the street
area and any construction damages, as fallows:
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" . . . Evidence of damag~ done to the defendants' holdings during construction, may be
considered in determining said value but are not
binding or necessarily, or likely, to be the market
price of such an easement, but the amount must
be equal to or greater than the actual damage in
the case to said land and improvements. The
value of such an easement is defined as the price
one who desired such an easement, but not obligated to buy it, would pay for the easement; and
the value a person, who was not obligated to sell
such an easement, would sell it for under the
circumstances."
It is very clear that the lower Court fully instructed
the jury under the evidence as to the relationship between any construction damages to the easement and
its "before" and "after" market value. As such the
damages complained of by appellants in this trespass
action have been completely and fully covered, and there
is no issue of damages left for this matter to determine.
Counsel for appellants, in a letter addressed to the
Clerk of the Second District Court on May 11, 1961,
wherein he made a suggestion that ". . . the two cases
should be consolidated for trial ... ," just about hit
the nail on the head when he further indicated in his
letter as follows:
"There are two cases involving substantially
the same matter."
See File No. 35984
As illustrative of the actual benefit the Russells
will receive over years to come by using the new ditch
system which will be Company maintained - as dis-
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tinguished from their obligation to maintain a substantial portion of the old ditch lateral - Instruction No. 3,
given by the lower Court in the condemnation action in
Case No. 35984, is here included:
"You are instructed that under the law the
plaintiff has the right to enter upon and enlarge
an existing irrigation ditch which may be used
by others for the purpose of conveying its own
water with that of the defendants in an enlarged
ditch. In this respect, the law provides that the
plaintiff shall bear its proportionate burden of
operational costs and upkeep, as well as the initial
construction costs, of the enlarged ditch system.
In this case, the plaintiff, Hooper Irrigation
Company, has, in fact, paid the cost of the enlarged ditch system and has further agreed to
maintain such enlarged ditch system without any
request for reimbursement from the Russells for
the use of the enlarged ditch system which the
Russells may make in the future."
(I talics added)

POINT II
THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
HAVE BEEN BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
IN BOTH CASES.
In their brief the appellants raise the novel and
interesting argument that only appellants and respondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, " ... appear in both
the condemnation case and the present case." From this
premise they argue that the other defendants in this
case - not being parties to the condemnation suit -
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should be kept before the Court in this alleged trespass
action. However, as pointed out in their own brief and
in the respective files, all of the remaining defendants
are either water users farther down the new enlarged
ditch system who hold stock in the Hooper Irrigation
Company, or are some of the workmen and contractors
employed and engaged by the Hooper Irrigation Company in the construction of the new ditch facility. The
Hooper Irrigation Company is the real party in interest, and has always been the one charged with any liability for damages in both cases.
What appellants are attempting to state to the
Court now is that they should be entitled to collect once
from the Hooper Irrigation Company in the condemnation proceeding, and then to collect again from the other
defendants, if necessary, in the trespass action. That
the law allows but one recovery for a given wrong is
so clear as to require no authority at this point. Having
recovered for the damages to the irrigation easement
(including as an element of damages the consideration
of construction damages as provided for in the lower
Court's Instruction to the Jury), appellants cannot
recover again from defendants in this case who were not
parties to the prior condemnation action.
POINT III
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN A TRESPASS ACTION
WHERE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE
NOT PRESENT.
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Because appellant in its proposed trespass action
claims the right to recover punitive damages, mention
should be made at this point regarding the legal status
of a punitive damage claim where there are no recoverable compensatory damages present. As to this matter
the rule is very definite that there can be no basis for
the recovery of punitive damages in the absence of
compensatory damages. In 22 Am. J ur. 2d, Par. 241,
at page 329, it is stated:
"Applying the rule that there is no cause of
action for exemplary damages alone to a case
where the complainant has attached his claim to
a cause of action requiring allegation and proof
of compensatory damages, failure to allege and
to prove compensatory damages will prevent the
complainant from sustaining or recovering an
award of exemplary damages ... "
In Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456
( 1954) , this Court held error to exist in allowing
$5,000.00 as punitive damages. The case concerned an
accounting for partnership profits and damages. On
page 459 this Court said:
"Defendants next contend that the court
erred in allowing $5,000.00 punitive damages.
We agree. As was the case with compensatory
damages, there are no specific p~adings, only
a general allegation of fraud in the amended
complaint. Standing alone, the failure to. set
forth a specific pleading may not be fatal smce
the damages may follow as a conclusion of law
from the allegation of fraud, 15 Am. J ur., Dam·
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ages, Sec. 304; however, the general rule is that
there can be no punitive damages without compensatory damages based on the tort ... "
In their brief (Memorandum for Plaintiffs) filed
in the lower Court objecting to the Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 11), appellants admitted the foregoing to be the law:
"With respect to the first point, we admit that
punitive damages cannot be recovered without
the recovery of compensatory damages; ... "
CONCLUSION
It is the position of this respondent that Judge
Cowley was fully warranted in granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents for the reason that no
genuine issue of law or fact remained for consideration
in this trespass action inasmuch as all items of damage
were adequately covered in the companion condemnation action, and that there is no basis for any further
relief in favor of appellants in this proceeding. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Respondents
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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